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IMPACT OF CONTINGENCY FEE AGREEMENTS
ON "REASONABLE" ATTORNEY FEES
AWARDED PURSUANT TO WISCONSIN
FEE-SHIFTING STATUTES
I. INTRODUCTION
Disputes relating to attorney fees pursuant to fee-shifting statutes
can often overshadow the substantive merits of a case, given the amount
of time courts must dedicate to determining "reasonable" attorney fees
at both the trial and appellate levels.! This determination can be a
daunting task, often requiring judges to scrutinize detailed time sheets,
affidavits, testimony, and studies indicating hourly rates for similar
work.2
In the absence of a fee-shifting statute, each party is responsible for
paying its own attorney fees3 because Wisconsin adheres to the
American Rule.4 There are exceptions to this Rule; for example, where
the legislature enacts fee-shifting statutes entitling the prevailing party
to collect attorney fees under specific conditions or where courts invoke
their equitable powers to make the prevailing party "whole."5 In either
1. See GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR., THE LAW AND ETHICS OF LAWYERING 522-28 (3d
ed. 1999) (citations omitted), for a discussion of the American Rule and court-awarded
attorney fees pursuant to fee-shifting statutes:
Determining attorney's fees is difficult and tends to be hotly contested. A great deal
of wasted effort-peripheral litigation not involving the merits-is involved in
making an attorney fee award in every case unless, as in most foreign countries,
relatively arbitrary amounts are awarded automatically. . . . Calculation of a
"reasonable fee" under such statutes has consumed innumerable hours at the trial
court level, generated a formidable number of appellate court decisions and
occasioned much comment in legal journals.
Id. at 523, 525. Wisconsin courts have had their fair share of disputes relating solely to what
constitutes "reasonable" attorney fees. See generally Stathus v. Horst, 2003 WI App 28, 659
N.W.2d 165 and Kolupar v. Wilde Pontiac Cadillac, Inc., 2003 WI App 175, 668 N.W.2d 798,
which are discussed infra Parts III and IV.
2. Lawrence A. Towers, Statutory Attorney's Fees, 62 Wis. LAW. 19, Nov. 1989, at 21.
3. Stelpflug v. Town Bd., 2000 WI 81, 30, 612 N.W.2d 700, 708 ("Wisconsin follows the
American Rule on the award of attorney fees.").
4. See HAZARD, supra note 1, at 522 ("The American rule is that each litigant must
absorb her own litigation expenses, including attorney's fees.").
5. There are also three generally recognized common law exceptions to the American
Rule:
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situation, the fees awarded should not exceed the contingent fee that the
prevailing party has to pay its counsel.
Where fees are awarded pursuant to a "make whole" theory, it is
illogical for a court to permit a prevailing party to collect fees from its
opponent in excess of the contingent fee that the prevailing party would
be actually required to pay its counsel. Instead of making the prevailing
party whole, this would create a windfall for the prevailing party and
would impose a punitive award against the prevailing party's opponent.
It seems inherently unfair to make the "loser" pay more for the
prevailing party's attorney than the prevailing party itself has to pay.6
Likewise, where attorney fees are awarded pursuant to a fee-shifting
statute, the fees awarded should not exceed the contingent fee that
counsel is entitled to collect, unless the legislative intent behind the fee-
shifting statute was to ensure that attorneys take cases with minimal
economic value to advance an important policy, such as the protection
of civil rights.7 Neither the Wisconsin Supreme Court nor the Wisconsin
Court of Appeals has explicitly adopted this view-nor has either court
rejected it. However, the Wisconsin Court of Appeals has implied in
Stathus v. Horst8 that a prevailing party cannot recover attorney fees in
excess of a contingency fee agreement when the applicable fee-shifting
statute permits recovery of "[a]ll costs of . . . litigation that were
reasonably incurred."9
This Comment focuses on attorney fees awarded pursuant to fee-
shifting statutes" and suggests that Wisconsin courts interpret the phrase
"reasonable attorney fees" in the same manner that the Stathus court
(1) situations in which the parties have provided for fee shifting by contract;
(2) when the losing party has litigated in bad faith; and
(3) the common fund doctrine, applicable when a litigant expends attorney fees in
creating a common fund from which others-such as a class of shareholders, trust
beneficiaries or the like-may benefit.
HAZARD, supra note 1, at 525 (citations omitted). Because this Comment is an analysis of
state law, it will focus on statutory exceptions to the American rule.
6. Tetrault v. Fairchild, 799 So. 2d 226 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001) (Harris, J., concurring).
7. The Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Act of 1976 ("Fees Act"), 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (2003), is
a primary example of where a prevailing plaintiff could arguably collect attorney fees in
excess of his contingency fee agreement because the "legislative purpose [of the Act] ... was
to ensure that civil rights plaintiffs are provided with competent representation." See
generally HAZARD, supra note 1, at 523-24.
8. 2003 WI App 28, 659 N.W.2d 165.
9. Id. 18 (quoting Wis. Stat. § 895.80(3)(b) (2003)) (emphasis added).
10. The analysis when there is an applicable fee-shifting statute is similar to the analysis
when courts award fees under a "make whole" theory.
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interpreted "incurred" attorney fees: as limiting the amount a prevailing
party can recover, when its fees were incurred under a contingency
agreement, to the contingent amount. To that end, Part II discusses
Wisconsin's fee-shifting statutes, with an emphasis on those statutes
enacted for public policy purposes. Part III discusses the Wisconsin
Court of Appeals' decision in Stathus v. Horst," where the court
interpreted a fee-shifting statute that permits recovery of "incurred"
attorney fees. Part IV addresses three questions that arise when
Wisconsin courts award "reasonable" attorney fees: (1) How do
Wisconsin courts arrive at a "reasonable" amount where fees were not
incurred via a contingency agreement, (2) how do Wisconsin courts
arrive at a "reasonable" amount where fees were incurred via a
contingency agreement, and (3) should the courts' methodology be the
same in each situation? Finally, Part V addresses how Wisconsin courts
should determine the amount of attorney fees to award where there is
an applicable fee-shifting statute, the purpose of the statute is not to
protect civil or consumer rights, and the fees were incurred via a
contingency agreement. 2
II. WISCONSIN FEE-SHIFTING STATUTES
The Wisconsin Legislature has created many statutory exceptions to
the American Rule, making it possible for prevailing parties to recover
attorney fees in a variety of situations. 3 These statutes generally have
either a procedural or a public policy purpose and typically include
language indicating that the prevailing party is entitled to "reasonable
attorney fees, 14 "reasonably incurred attorney fees," 5 or "reasonable
actual attorney fees.', 16  Procedural purposes include preventing
11. 2003 WI App 28, 659 N.W.2d 165.
12. Contingency fee agreements are most commonly associated with personal injury
suits; however, "[clontingent fees are common in tax refund practice, condemnation
proceedings, suits challenging wills, debt collection cases and class action suits for damages."
HAZARD, supra note 1, at 510. Because this Comment focuses on attorney fees awarded
pursuant to fee-shifting statutes, the types of contingency agreements this Comment refers to
are typically unrelated to personal injury matters (as most Wisconsin fee-shifting statutes are
unrelated to personal injuries).
13. This discussion of Wisconsin fee-shifting statutes is modeled in part on Steven P.
Means, Recovering Attorney Fees, Wis. LAW., Aug. 1995, at 14-17, 62.
14. See WIS. STAT. §§ 132.033(2)(d) (2003) (trademark violations), 138.052(12) (2003)
(residential mortgage loans).
15. See Wis. STAT. § 180.0746(2) (2003) (payment of expenses in shareholder derivative
suit).
16. See Wis. STAT. §§ 32.17 (2003) (general eminent domain), 46.90 (elder abuse
reporting system), 48.236 (holding a child or an expectant mother in custody), 125.33
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frivolous lawsuits'7 and enabling prevailing parties to recover up to $500
in attorney fees as costs.'8 Public policy purposes include protecting
consumer rights19 and restoring victims of intentional property damage
to their original position.20
The majority of Wisconsin fee-shifting statutes were enacted for
public policy purposes. For courts to interpret these statutes properly,
they must carefully distinguish the legislative intent behind each statute:
Was the intent to promote a policy by ensuring that attorneys take cases
with minimal economic value-in other words, to use an award of
attorney fees as an incentive for plaintiffs and lawyers to bring lawsuits
that a rational actor may conclude are not worth bringing based solely
on economic value? Or was the intent to ensure that certain types of
prevailing parties would be "made whole" or restored to the position
they were in prior to the lawsuit? If the legislative intent was the
former, the court should be permitted to award attorney fees in excess
of the contingent fee, if the court believes that is necessary to carry out
the underlying legislative policy. Alternatively, if the legislative intent
was only to restore the prevailing party to its pre-lawsuit position, the
(restrictions on dealings between brewers, wholesalers, and retailers), 134.93 (payment of
commissions to independent sales representatives), 135.06 (dealership practices), 610.70
(disclosures of personal medical information).
Whether Wisconsin courts should interpret fee-shifting statutes differently depending on
which phrase is used by the legislature has yet to be conclusively decided by the Wisconsin
Supreme Court. However, the Wisconsin Court of Appeals has suggested that courts are
more limited in the amount of fees they can award when the legislature specifies that the fees
must be "incurred." Stathus v. Horst, 2003 WI App 18, T 24, 659 N.W.2d 165, 170. Part III of
this Comment addresses the court of appeals' decision on that matter, and Part V analyzes
whether the Wisconsin Supreme Court should in fact differentiate among fee-shifting statutes
depending on whether the legislature uses the word "incurred" in the statute.
17. WtS. STAT. §§ 814.025, 809.25(3)(c) (2003).
18. Id. § 814.04. The introduction to section 814.04 lists nineteen fee-shifting statutes
that section 814.04 does not apply to, making it possible for prevailing parties to recover no
more than $100 in attorney fees if one of the nineteen fee-shifting statutes applies. For
example, section 895.75(3) is listed in section 814.04 as an exception to the $100 rule and
provides that a prevailing party who "suffers physical injury to his or her person or emotional
distress or damage to or loss of his or her property" as a result of graffiti is entitled to recover
"costs, including all reasonable attorney fees and other costs of the investigation and litigation
which were reasonably incurred."
After the legislature adopted section 814.04, it continued to create new fee-shifting
statutes, but rather than list all of those statutes in section 814.04, it prefaced the new fee-
shifting statutes with the language "notwithstanding s. 814.04(1)." For example, section
180.0746(1), which applies to business corporations, states that "[n]otwithstanding s.
814.04(1), [a court may] order the domestic corporation... to pay the plaintiff's reasonable
expenses, including attorney fees,.., incurred in the derivative proceeding."
19. Wisconsin Consumer Act, WIS. STAT. §§ 421-427 (2003).
20. WIS. STAT. § 895.80(1) (2003).
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court should be limited to awarding the prevailing party no more than
its contingent fee.
A. Fee-Shifting Statutes Intended to Ensure that Lawsuits of Minimal
Economic Value Are Brought
The idea of actually creating laws to "encourage" litigation may
strike lay people as odd; however, litigation is sometimes necessary to
protect fundamental rights, especially when a party does not have the
resources to hire competent counsel." Therefore, the legislature enacts
fee-shifting statutes to provide an incentive for attorneys to take these
cases, despite their minimal economic value.22 This in turn induces
persons to abide by the law, as "[tihe risk of having to pay the injured
party's fees encourages the calculating actor to conform to the law
rather than to risk liability."23 When public policy fee-shifting statutes
are enacted for this purpose, a court could legitimately award attorney
fees that exceed counsel's contingent fee to make the cases attractive to
lawyers, which will in turn encourage persons to conform their behavior
to the law.
For example, the United States Supreme Court stated that
Congress's intent in enacting the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Act of
1976 ("Fees Act")," which entitles the prevailing party to attorney fees,
was to induce litigation:
The intention of Congress [in enacting the Fees Act] was to
encourage successful civil rights litigation.. . . "[W]e reject the
notion that a civil rights action for damages constitutes nothing
more than a private tort suit benefiting only the individual
plaintiffs whose rights were violated. Unlike most private tort
litigants, a civil rights plaintiff seeks to vindicate important civil
and constitutional rights that cannot be valued solely in
monetary terms.,
25
21. HAZARD, supra note 1, at 524 ("[A] one-way fee shifting statute, providing a fee
award to prevailing plaintiffs, stimulates the enforcement of the underlying right.").
22. State legislatures have mirrored Congress in this respect: "Congress has enacted
more than two hundred fee-shifting statutes to encourage lawyers to provide representation
in meritorious public interest litigation as private attorneys general. Many state legislatures
have followed Congress's lead and enacted similar statutes." Russell E. Lovell, II, Court-
Awarded Attorneys' Fees: Examining Issues of Delay, Payment, and Risk, 1999 A.B.A. SEC.
STATE & LOCAL GOV'T LAW 1.
23. HAZARD, supra note 1, at 524.
24. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (2003).
25. Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87, 95-96 (1989) (quoting City of Riverside v.
2005] 1017
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Similar to the Fees Act, a Wisconsin civil rights statute that prohibits
employers from retaliating against migrant workers seeks to ensure that
attorneys provide representation to a specific group of plaintiffs, despite
that the cases will have little economic value.26 If a migrant worker
succeeds in a suit against his employer under this statute, "[i]n cases of
aggravated circumstances, the court may also assess reasonable attorney
fees."27 Considering that this statute seeks to protect migrant workers, a
potentially vulnerable class due to language barriers or unfamiliarity
with state and federal law, one could reasonably assume that the
legislature had several intentions in enacting this fee-shifting statute: (1)
to encourage attorneys to represent migrant workers, even if the
migrant workers do not have the means to pay them, (2) to encourage
and enable migrant workers to bring suit if their rights are violated, and
(3) to discourage employers of migrant workers from taking advantage
of their employees. Based on these intentions, courts could legitimately
award attorney fees that exceed a contingent fee.
Another example of the legislature attempting to "encourage"
meritorious litigation is the fee-shifting provision in the Wisconsin
Consumer Act ("WCA").u The introductory language of the statute
clearly states the important policies it aims to protect: "[The]
underlying purposes and policies . . . [of the WCA are t]o protect
customers against unfair, deceptive, false, misleading and
Rivera, 477 U.S. 561, 574 (1986)). In Blanchard, the United States Supreme Court
interpreted the Fees Act as it applies to contingency fee agreements. Plaintiff brought suit for
an alleged violation of his civil rights, claiming that a sheriff's deputy beat him. Id. at 88. A
jury awarded plaintiff $10,000 in total damages and plaintiff sought attorney fees and costs of
more than $40,000. Id. at 89. The district court awarded him only $7500 in attorney fees, and
plaintiff appealed that award. Id. at 89-90. The Fifth Circuit reduced the award of attorney
fees to the amount plaintiff's counsel was entitled to under their contingency fee agreement.
Id. at 90. The Supreme Court reversed the Fifth Circuit and determined that "[t]he attorney's
fee provided for in a contingent-fee agreement is not a ceiling upon the fees recoverable
under § 1988." Id. at 96. The Court looked to the legislative intent behind the Act, which
stated that "in computing the fee, counsel for prevailing parties should be paid, as is
traditional with attorneys compensated by a fee-paying client, 'for all time reasonably
expended on a matter."' Id. at 91 (quoting S. Rep. No. 94-1011, at 6 (1976)). In addition,
"[t]he purpose of § 1988 is to ensure 'effective access to the judicial process' for persons with
civil rights grievances." Id. at 95 (quoting H. R. Rep., No. 94-1558, at 1 (1976)).
The Wisconsin Supreme Court reached this same conclusion in Thompson v. Village of
Hales Corners, 115 Wis. 2d 289, 340 N.W.2d 704 (1983), where it determined that § 1988 does
not intend for a contingency fee agreement to serve as a ceiling for the amount of attorney
fees that can be awarded.
26. WIS. STAT. § 103.96(1) (2003).
27. Id. § 103.96(2).
28. Wisconsin Consumer Act, Wis. STAT. §§ 421-427 (2003).
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unconscionable practices by merchants, [and t]o permit and encourage
the development of fair and economically sound consumer practices in
consumer transactions .... ,,29 Furthermore, the Wisconsin Supreme
Court has stated that "WCA actions frequently present important legal
questions for both the consumer and the creditor which bear on the
public policy of consumer protection. '' o
Because protecting consumers is a clear priority of the legislature,
courts properly can award attorney fees that exceed a contingent fee to
make it possible for consumers to maintain claims under the WCA. In
First Wisconsin National Bank v. Nicolaou,31 the Wisconsin Supreme
Court held that the WCA did not restrict recoverable attorney fees to
those that were "incurred" but rather required recovery of "a
reasonable amount for attorney fees" for prevailing consumers.32 The
plaintiffs in Nicolaou agreed to pay their attorneys a monthly retainer
plus expenses.33 The attorney fees awarded exceeded the amount
plaintiffs ultimately had to pay their counsel under their retainer;
however, adequate attorney fees should be awarded to prevailing
consumers to induce litigation pursuant to the legislature's intent.3"
B. Fee-Shifting Statutes Intended to Restore Parties to
Their Original Position
Most fee-shifting statutes are not meant to ensure that attorneys
represent plaintiffs in cases of minimal economic value. Rather, most
fee-shifting statutes are meant to ensure that prevailing parties are
"made whole" or restored to the position they were in prior to the
lawsuit so that it is possible for "a little guy ... [to] take on [a] big guy."35
These types of public policy fee-shifting statutes can be found in a
variety of contexts, including derivative suits,36 patient health care
records,37 trade regulations,38 interest payments,39 payment of state
29. Wisconsin Consumer Act, WIS. STAT. § 421.102(2)(b)-(c) (2003).
30. First Wis. Nat'l Bank v. Nicolaou, 113 Wis. 2d 524, 539, 335 N.W.2d 390, 397 (1983).
31. Id. at 536, 335 N.W.2d at 396.
32. See Stathus v. Horst, 2003 WI App 28 21, 659 N.W.2d 165, 170 (citing Nicolaou,
113 Wis. 2d at 536, 335 N.W.2d at 396).
33. Nicolaou, 113 Wis. 2d at 540, 335 N.W.2d at 398.
34. Id. at 539, 335 N.W.2d at 397.
35. Kolupar v. Wilde Pontiac Cadillac, Inc., 2003 WI App 175, 17, 668 N.W.2d 798,
805.
36. WIS. STAT. § 180.0746(1) (2003).
37. Id. § 146.84(1)(b).
38. Id. § 134.23(5).
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employee attorney fees,4" and property damage.41 In these contexts,
courts should not be permitted to award attorney fees that exceed the
prevailing party's contingent fee because the legislature's intent is to
restore the prevailing party to its pre-lawsuit position.
III. WISCONSIN COURT OF APPEALS' DECISION IN STA THUS v. HORST
Contingency fee agreements commonly are entered into in personal-
injury lawsuits; however, the facts of Stathus v. Horst43 provide a good
example of a contingency agreement in a nonpersonal injury context. In
Stathus, the Wisconsin Court of Appeals addressed an issue of first
impression in Wisconsin: "Whether a trial court can award attorney[]
fees which exceed what was actually 'incurred,' contrary to the clear
language" of the controlling fee-shifting statute."
In Stathus, defendants sold their house to the plaintiffs and made
several intentional misrepresentations relating to the property. As a
result, plaintiffs sued and entered into a contingency fee agreement with
their counsel.46 The agreement provided that counsel would receive
one-third of any judgment awarded at the trial court level or forty
percent of any judgment awarded on appeal. In addition, it contained
language indicating that plaintiffs expressly declined to pay their counsel
an hourly rate. 8 Plaintiffs prevailed at trial and were awarded $5000 in
compensatory damages and $3000 in attorney fees. 49  Defendants
subsequently appealed, and the appellate court affirmed that defendants
made a misrepresentation but remanded the case to the trial court for
reconsideration of the attorney fees "because the trial court's award did
not reflect any exercise of discretion. '
On remand, the case went before a new trial judge51 who awarded
attorney fees of $22,000, which was $20,000 more than plaintiffs' counsel
39. Id. § 16.528(6).
40. Id. § 775.11(3) (2003).
41. Id. § 895.80(3) (2003).
42. See discussion infra Part V.








51. The original trial judge passed away. Id. [ 3, n.1.
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was entitled to under their contingency agreement. 2 Defendants
appealed that ruling." The court of appeals reversed the trial court's
award of attorney fees and remanded the matter a second time,
instructing the trial court to (1) apply the "rule of limitation imposed"
by the controlling fee-shifting statute and (2) apply the standard for
"reasonable" attorney fees as outlined in Standard Theatres, Inc. v. State
Department of Transportation.54
A. The Attorney Fees Must Be Incurred
The Stathus court adopted the rationale of the Fifth Circuit5 and
looked to the "clear language" of the applicable fee-shifting statute-in
this case section 895.80(3)-which states that the prevailing plaintiff may
recover "[a]ll costs of investigation and litigation that were reasonably
incurred."56  Based on that language, the court implied that where
attorney fees are "incurred" via a contingency fee agreement, the fees
awarded should not exceed the contingent fee.57 In further support of its
rationale, the Stathus court quoted the Oklahoma Supreme Court,
which stated:
The majority of courts . . . find that the phrase "actually
incurred" limits the attorney fees which may be awarded to the
client's actual outlay or contractual obligation. These courts
reason that use of the term "actually incurred" is clear and
unambiguous and that it is intended to define the maximum




54. Id. 1 25 (citing to Standard Theatres, Inc. v. State Dep't of Transp., 118 Wis. 2d 730,
349 N.W.2d 661 (1984)).
55. See Marr6 v. United States, 38 F.3d 823 (5th Cir. 1994).
56. Stathus, 2003 WI App 28, 18.
57. Id. 91 24. The Stathus court made the following statement in reference to the
appellants' argument, which suggests that the court believes that the amount of a contingent
fee does serve as the outer limit for attorney fees pursuant to a fee-shifting statute: "They
[i.e., appellants] argue that these cases hold that the existence of a contingent fee agreement
is not determinative when calculating the award for fees. We are not persuaded." Id. 91 19,
659 N.W.2d at 169.
58. Id. 91 23 n.3 (quoting Oklahoma ex rel. Dep't of Transp. v. Norman Indus. Dev.
Corp., 41 P.3d 960, 965 (Okla. 2001)).
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The Stathus court's analysis suggests that had the applicable fee-
shifting statute used the language "reasonable attorney fees" rather than
"reasonably incurred attorney fees," the Stathus court may have arrived
at a different result: The court may have permitted the trial court to
award attorney fees in excess of the contingent fee.59 Because the
legislature's intent in enacting section 895.80(3) likely was to restore the
prevailing party to its pre-lawsuit position, the court's analysis should
not turn on whether the legislature used the word "incurred."
B. The Incurred Fees Must Be "Reasonable"
The Stathus court held that the trial court failed to exercise its
discretion when awarding $22,000 in attorney fees because the trial
court failed to determine whether that fee was "reasonable." 6 The trial
judge multiplied an hourly rate of $150 by the number of hours counsel
spent on the case, with a discount on those hours spent on the appeal,
and then simply determined that the award was "reasonable., 61  The
court of appeals stated that a proper exercise of discretion "requires a
reasonable inquiry and an examination of the pertinent facts., 62 This
necessarily involves the trial judge considering one or more of the eight
"reasonableness" factors outlined by the Wisconsin Supreme Court in
Standard Theatres.63
Among the eight factors, the last factor specifically permits the court
to take into account whether the prevailing party entered into a
contingency fee agreement with its counsel, although the Stathus court
did not comment on this last factor or explain how it should apply to the
case. In the end, the Stathus court remanded the matter to the trial
court, stating only that "the award must be based on the attorney[] fees
59. The Stathus court dismissed an argument made by the defendants that section 100.18
of the Wisconsin Statutes was the controlling fee-shifting statute in the case because the trial
court clearly made findings under section 895.80(3). Stathus, 2003 WI App 28 $T 15, 16.
Section 100.18(11)(b)(2) states that the prevailing party is entitled to "reasonable attorney
fees" and does not require that those fees be incurred. Thus, it is likely that had section
100.18(11)(b)(2) applied, the Stathus court would have permitted an award of attorney fees in
excess of the contingent fee. Whether Wisconsin courts should take a different approach
when awarding attorney fees depending on if the fee-shifting statute specifies that the fees
must be "incurred"-as opposed to simply permitting the recovery of "reasonable attorney
fees"-is discussed later in this Comment. See discussion infra Part V.
60. Stathus, 2003 WI App 28, T 13.
61. Id.
62. Id. $ 14.
63. Id. (citing Standard Theatres, Inc. v. State Dep't of Transp., 118 Wis. 2d 730, 749-50
n.9, 349 N.W.2d 661 (1984)). See discussion of these eight factors infra Part IV.
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that were actually incurred and that amount must be reasonable." 6'
IV. How MUCH IS A "REASONABLE" ATTORNEY FEE?
Almost every fee-shifting statute in Wisconsin stipulates that
attorney fees must be "reasonable., 65  This Part of the Comment
addresses how Wisconsin courts arrive at "reasonable" fees when the
fees were not incurred under a contingency agreement versus when they
were incurred under such an agreement. The Stathus court provided
guidance on this matter when it directed the trial court to "apply the
appropriate standards for determining 'reasonableness' set forth in
Standard Theatres,"66 which are listed below:
a) The time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of
the questions involved and the skill requisite to perform
the legal service properly.
b) The likelihood, if apparent to the client, that the
acceptance of the particular employment will preclude
other employment by the lawyer.
c) The fee customarily charged in the locality for similar
legal services.
d) The amount involved and the results obtained.
e) The time limitations imposed by the client or by the
circumstances.
f) The nature and length of the professional relationship
with the client.
g) The experience, reputation and ability of the lawyer or
lawyers performing the services.
h) Whether the fee is fixed or contingent.67
Given that the last of the eight standards is whether the fee is fixed
or contingent, one would be correct to assume that Wisconsin courts do,
in fact, use the same methodology for determining a "reasonable" fee
regardless of whether the fee was fixed or contingent. This must change
because of the very nature of contingency agreements: Although
attorneys will sometimes receive no compensation for their work (i.e.,
64. Id. 24.
65. See statutes cited supra notes 14-16.
66. Stathus, 2003 WI App 28, 25.
67. Id. 1 14 (citing Standard Theatres, Inc. v. State Dep't of Transp., 118 Wis. 2d 730,
749-50 n.9, 349 N.W.2d 661 (1984)).
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when they lose), they hope to make up for that lack of payment when
they win. Thus, in order for contingency agreements to be viable
options for attorneys, courts must permit attorneys to recover fees in the
amount of their contingent fee-no more or no less-despite that the
fee may seem "unreasonable" for the amount of work they performed in
a particular case.
A. Methodology Wisconsin Courts Use to Determine
"Reasonable" Attorney Fees
The initial determination of attorney fees is made at the trial court
level, and it is within the discretion of the trial court to hold a hearing to
determine the amount of attorney fees to award. 6' Appellate courts
typically defer to a trial court's determination of reasonable attorney
fees because trial courts have the "'advantageous position to observe the
amount and quality of the work performed and ha[ve] the expertise to
evaluate the reasonableness of the fees."' 69
There is no formula for properly arriving at a reasonable attorney
fee. Courts will generally first consider "'whether costs could have been
avoided by a reasonable and prudent effort."' 7  Next, courts might
"consider whether the final judgment is out of proportion to the
attorney[] fees that were generated in the case and whether the resultant
verdict justifies the amount of money expended. 71 Courts then refer to
Supreme Court Rule 20:1.5, which "lists additional factors that may help
a trial court determine the reasonableness of an attorney's fee. 72 These
are the eight factors that the Stathus court instructed the trial court to
consider on remand.73
68. Kolupar v. Wilde Pontiac Cadillac, Inc., 2003 WI App 175, 16, 668 N.W.2d 798,
804.
69. Beaudette v. Eau Claire County Sheriff's Dep't, 2003 WI App 153, 31, 265 Wis. 2d
744, 765, 668 N.W.2d 133, 143 (quoting Allied Processors, Inc. v. W. Nat'l Mut. Ins. Co., 2001
W1 App 129, 46, 629 N.W.2d 329, 342).
70. Kolupar, 2003 WI App 175, 16 (quoting Aspen Servs., Inc. v. IT Corp., 220 Wis. 2d
491, 499, 583 N.W.2d 849, 851 (Ct. App. 1998)).
71. Id. 16 (citing Aspen, 220 Wis. 2d at 497 n.5, 583 N.W.2d at 852).
72. Id. (citing Vill. of Shorewood v. Steinberg, 174 Wis. 2d 191, 205, 496 N.W.2d 57, 62
(1993)).
73. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
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1. Determining "Reasonable" Fees When Fees Were Not Incurred
Under a Contingency Agreement
In Kolupar, the trial court awarded "reasonable" attorney fees based
principally on the recommendations of a discovery referee.74 The trial
court also stated that the "case was over-tried ... [and d]iscovery was..
. well over-done. 7 5 Based on these findings, the trial court awarded
$15,000 in attorney fees and costs, significantly less than the prevailing
party's $53,000 request. 6 Similarly, in a labor relations case where the
prevailing employees requested $14,000 in attorney fees, the court
awarded only $9500 in fees." The trial court noted that the amount of
requested fees exceeded the amount in controversy in the case."8 In
addition, "the court pointed out that the employees' three attorneys
spent 112 hours on the case, much of which was devoted to research and
intraoffice conferences," despite the fact that there was not a lot of case
law related to the matter. 9
From time to time, the Wisconsin Supreme Court also becomes
involved in fee disputes. It reversed a trial court's award of fees where
the trial court did not have sufficient information to determine a
reasonable attorney fee.8" The affidavit the trial court relied on in
arriving at a reasonable fee "did not provide sufficiently detailed
information concerning who performed legal services, at what rate, for
what amount of time, and what services were provided. 8 ' Therefore,
the supreme court reversed the trial court's award and remanded the
case for reconsideration of the fees.8
2. Determining "Reasonable" Fees When Fees Were Incurred Under a
Contingency Agreement
As the following cases will demonstrate, courts apply the same
"reasonableness" standards when attorney fees are incurred as a
contingent fee. While courts do not explicitly make a distinction
74. Kolupar v. Wilde Pontiac Cadillac, Inc., 2003 WI App 175, T 7,668 N.W.2d 798, 801.
75. Id. 17.
76. Id. T 7.




80. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Bradley Corp., 2003 WI 33, 42, 660 N.W.2d 666, 685.
81. Id. T 68.
82. Id. 1 70.
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between the reasonableness of the contingency agreement itself and the
reasonableness of the contingent fee amount, it is apparent that a
distinction exists. With respect to the fee agreement itself, courts
typically refuse to enforce contingency agreements that permit attorneys
to recover in excess of fifty percent of the prevailing party's recovery, 3
and many states have "set caps for allowable contingency fees."'
However, even if the agreement itself is reasonable-for example,
one-third of any recovery-courts still consider the reasonableness of
the contingent amount that the attorney stands to recover. The
Wisconsin Supreme Court stated in an eminent domain case that "courts
should use 'a contingency fee agreement as a guide only and must
consider all the circumstances of the case to determine whether the
contingency fee amount is a just and reasonable figure,"' including the
eight factors listed in Supreme Court Rule 20:1.5.85 Applying this
reasoning, the Wisconsin Court of Appeals upheld a trial court's award
of attorney fees, which were equal to the one-third contingent fee that
plaintiff's attorney was entitled to under their fee agreement.86  In
arriving at its decision, the court of appeals held that the trial court
properly exercised its discretion because it considered the "hundreds
and hundreds of hours" that went into the case, the "very, very
substantial amounts of money" that the client stood to receive, and the
fact that it was "obviously a very, very serious injury case., 87  In
addition, the trial court recognized the risks the attorney took in trying
worker's compensation cases on a contingent basis:
I am very well aware of how plaintiff's counsel can come into
court after spending hundreds and hundreds of hours, if not
thousands in some cases, to be stuck with the costs and no
compensation. And [a] one third [sic] contingent fee is not
designed to in each and every case specifically compensate the
lawyer for the work that had been done on an hourly basis or--
83. See LESTER BRICKMAN ET AL., RETHINKING CONTINGENCY FEES, JUDICIAL
STUDIES PROGRAM 13 (The Manhattan Institute 1994) ("[C]ontingency fee rates seldom
amount to less than one third.., of recoveries when cases are settled without trial, 40% if
cases go to trial and 50% if appeals are necessary to sustain the trial judgments.") (footnote
omitted); VICTOR E. SCHWARTZ ET AL., PROSSER, WADE AND SCHWARTZ'S TORTS: CASES
AND MATERIALS 543 (10th ed. 2000) ("A common contingent fee is 30%-40%.").
84. BRICKMAN ET AL., supra note 83, at 17.
85. Meyer v. Mich. Mut. Ins. Co., 2000 WI App 53, J 13, 609 N.W.2d 167, 170 (quoting
Vill. of Shorewood v. Steinberg, 174 Wis. 2d 191, 204, 496 N.W.2d 57, 62 (1993)).
86. Id. 29.
87. Id. [[ 18-20.
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it's a gamble. And sometimes I think lawyers are foolish...
because it would have been better spending the money in Las
Vegas. The odds would have been better maybe.'
For courts to apply the eight standards outlined in Wisconsin
Supreme Court Rule 20:1.5, it is often necessary to "incorporate
customary fixed-fee rates [i.e., hourly rates] into the calculus of
reasonableness," despite that the fees were not incurred on an hourly
basis. 9 For example, a court awarded attorney fees that were less than
the attorney's one-third contingent fee because the court found "the
resulting fee under the fee-contract ($813.57 per hour) to be
unreasonable."9 When the court converts the contingent fee to an
hourly rate, of course it is going to seem unreasonable. However, there
are many factors that go into a contingent fee that are not accurately
reflected when courts simply transform a contingent fee into an hourly
rate, which is precisely why courts need to adopt a different
methodology for determining the reasonableness of contingent fees.
B. Wisconsin Courts Should Use a Different Standard of
"Reasonableness" for Contingent Fees
Attorneys who regularly enter into contingency agreements take
risks; on a case-by-case basis, they expect to be over-compensated,
under-compensated, or not compensated at all. However, they hope
that the aggregate amount of fees they collect for their entire portfolio
of cases will enable them to make a sufficient hourly rate. Because
attorneys voluntarily take a calculated risk when entering into
contingency agreements-where the attorney will sometimes collect fees
that are extremely high or extremely low relative to the amount of time
they spend on a particular case-courts should refrain from scrutinizing
whether the contingent amount is reasonable.
If courts were to assess the reasonableness of the contingent fee,
conclude that a contingent fee was too low, and award attorney fees in
excess of the contingent fee, attorneys would no longer assume the risk
of receiving a low contingent fee. As a result, attorneys could recover
substantial attorney fees both when there is a low damage award-via
88. Id. 20.
89. Rosquist v. Soo Line R.R., 692 F.2d 1107, 1114 (7th Cir. 1982).
90. Id.; see also Reed v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 832 So. 2d 1132 (3d Cir. 2002)




court-awarded fees that exceed their contingent fee-and when there is
a high damage award-via the contingent fee itself. Alternatively, if
courts determine that a contingent fee is too high and award less than
the contingent fee, attorneys would be deterred from ever entering into
a contingency agreement because they cannot count on those high
contingent fee cases to make up for lost cases where they recover no fee.
Instead of assessing the reasonableness of contingent fees, courts
should ensure only that contingency fee agreements are procedurally
"reasonable." Accordingly, courts should ensure that the agreements
are in writing, the client understands that he could have hired his
counsel at an hourly rate, and the contingent percentage is not
unconscionable or in excess of any statutory cap.91 Whether the
contingent fee the attorney receives at the conclusion of the case is
reasonable should not be determined by courts, as lawyers "rely[] on the
fact that the vast majority [of cases] will produce a reasonable award, a
few will be big winners and another small percentage will be a partial or
total loss"' and make their fee agreements accordingly.
V. "REASONABLE ATTORNEY FEES" SHOULD NOT EXCEED
A CONTINGENT FEE
Where the legislative intent behind a fee-shifting statute is to restore
a prevailing party to its pre-lawsuit position, Wisconsin courts should
award fees that equal the contingent fee, regardless of whether the
statute stipulates that the fees must be "incurred." In other words, when
courts interpret fee-shifting statutes that stipulate that the fee must be
only "reasonable," and not "reasonably incurred," courts should assume
that the phrase "reasonable attorney fees" implies that those fees were
actually "incurred." It is unlikely that the legislature intended for
prevailing parties to be made more than whole in either situation:
[T]he purpose of requiring a losing party to pay the winner's
attorney fees is to make whole the... [party] who is retaliated
against for his or her action. Requiring a payment in excess of
100% of the victim's attorney fees does not make a victim
whole-it becomes a windfall for the victim or his or her
91. "The Model Rules and Model Code for the most part address procedural fairness-
whether a fee agreement is in writing and whether a client is informed of the different options
before agreeing to a contingent fee-rather than substantive fairness-whether a fee is
excessive." JOHN T. NOONAN, JR. & RICHARD W. PAINTER, PROFESSIONAL AND
PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE LAWYER 68 (2d ed. 2001).




Furthermore, when courts award fees in excess of the contingent fee, the
risk inherent in contingency agreements effectively is shifted from the
attorneys to the losing party, who is forced to pay an amount of attorney
fees that the prevailing party's attorney could not collect from his own
client.94
Consider Wisconsin Statute section 32.28 as an example: This
statute applies to eminent domain matters and permits a prevailing
party to recover "reasonable litigation expenses." These expenses are
defined in section 32.28(1) as "including reasonable attorney... fees. ' '9
While the statute does not explicitly state that the attorney fees must be
incurred, the court should presume that the legislature intended that the
fees would be incurred. Accordingly, if a prevailing party had entered
into a contingency agreement, he could not collect more than the
contingent fee that he owes his attorney under their agreement.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court has implicitly agreed with this
analysis by stating that the two purposes of section 32.28 are to
"discourage low jurisdictional offers and to make the condemnee whole
when the condemnee is forced to litigate in order to get the full value of
the property." However, in that same case, the prevailing party had
entered into a contingency fee agreement, and the Wisconsin Supreme
Court said that the agreement should be a "guide only and [the court]
must consider all the circumstances of the case to determine whether the
93. Bd. of Regents v. Wis. Pers. Comm'n, 147 Wis. 2d 406, 415-16, 433 N.W. 2d 273, 278
(Ct. App. 1988) (citing Watkins v. Labor & Indus. Review Comm'n, 117 Wis. 2d 753, 764, 345
N.W.2d 482, 487 (1984)).
94. Attorneys are clearly aware of this possibility and often contract to ensure that they
come out on top should a court award attorney fees in excess of the percentage of the award
they are entitled to under their fee agreement. Such a contractual provision would state that
plaintiffs will pay their counsel a portion of the recovery or the amount of attorney fees
awarded by the court, whichever is greater. See Tetrault v. Fairchild, 799 So. 2d 226, 232 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 2001) (Harris, J., concurring). This type of agreement was labeled a sham by
Florida district court Judge Harris, as such a clause does not actually bind the plaintiffs to pay
whatever fee the court determines, but rather "mean[s] that the plaintiff and his lawyer can
now 'authorize' the court to assess against the defendant a fee greater than the plaintiff would
be willing to pay for the same services." Id. This does not seem reasonable or fair, and Judge
Harris likens it to a "punitive award against the defendant." Id. at 235.
95. WIs. STAT. § 32.28(1) (2003).
96. Vill. of Shorewood v. Steinberg, 174 Wis. 2d 191, 207, 496 N.W.2d 57, 63 (1993)




contingency fee amount is a just and reasonable figure."97  This is
precisely what this Comment suggests courts should not do: It should
not matter if counsel is over- or under-compensated in a particular case,
for that is the nature of contingency fee agreements. Courts should
analyze only whether the agreement itself is reasonable.
VI. CONCLUSION
When Wisconsin courts apply fee-shifting statutes, they should
engage in the following analysis: The court should first determine the
legislative intent behind the applicable fee-shifting statute. If the intent
behind the statute was to protect a fundamental right or promote an
important policy by ensuring that attorneys represent plaintiffs in cases
with minimal economic value, the court is free to exercise its discretion
with respect to what a "reasonable" attorney fee should be.
Alternatively, if the intent behind the statute was only to restore the
prevailing party to his position prior to the lawsuit, the court should next
consider how the prevailing party paid his attorney. If the prevailing
party entered into a contingency fee agreement, then the court should
award attorney fees that equal the amount of the contingent fee,
regardless of whether the statute requires that attorney fees be
"reasonable" or "reasonably incurred." This will ensure that plaintiffs
do not receive a windfall at the expense of the defendant as a result of
fee awards that exceed the amount plaintiffs actually owe their counsel
under their contingency agreements. In addition, making the contingent
fee the ceiling for attorney-fee awards will promote judicial economy by
making it easier for courts to determine what a "reasonable" attorney
fee is.
In summary, when a court awards attorney fees to a prevailing party,
pursuant to a fee-shifting statute that was enacted to restore the
prevailing party to his pre-lawsuit position, the fees awarded should not
exceed the contingent fee actually incurred by the prevailing party. If
the fee-shifting statute does not state explicitly that the fees must be
"incurred" to be recoverable, Wisconsin courts should interpret the
legislative intent behind the statute as implicitly presuming that the fees
would be "incurred."
KATHERINE M. MONGOVEN
97. Id. at 204, 496 N.W.2d at 62 (citing Hutterli v. State Conservation Comm'n, 34 Wis.
2d 252, 259, 148 N.W.2d 849 (1967)).
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